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Using the internet to access confidential patient records:
a case study
D W Chadwick, P J Crook, A J Young, D M McDowell, T L Dornan, J P New
Effective programmes for management of chronic dis-
ease are invariably supported by information technol-
ogy. These have typically been developed within
secondary care, with limited access available to primary
care. The British government’s white paper The New
NHS clearly states that a dedicated NHS network serv-
ice (NHSnet), linking information systems in primary
and secondary care, will be working by 2002.1
Although this could improve the flow of information
between primary and secondary care, thereby improv-
ing patient care,1 there are, quite rightly, grave
concerns about the security and confidentiality of
patients’ data both in terms of who has legitimate
access and who has illegitimate access to the data.2 3
Furthermore, it cannot be assumed that all general
practitioners will be willing to spend the time and
money necessary to connect to NHSnet and to
conform to its code of connection,4 especially as more
than one in eight general practitioners are already
connected to and familiar with the internet5 and,
increasingly, internet service providers are free of
charge (apart from telephone charges). Users of
NHSnet, however, will be charged for connection and
use, the costs of which are not yet known. These are
major concerns for general practitioners and may be a
reason for the poor uptake of NHSnet by general
practice.5
In addition, although NHSnet could increase
hospitals’ and general practices’ access to patients’ data,
this information will still not be available within the
patients’ homes. This is exactly where general
practitioners, seeing sick patients whom they may not
know, need immediate access to this information.
Internet technology could also allow patients access to
their own data, thereby empowering them to allow
appropriate healthcare professionals access to their
data.
We suggest that the internet will be as good, if not
better, an integrating network as NHSnet, providing
that the issues of security and reliability can be
adequately addressed. Using our existing diabetes
information system (Westman Medical Software, Man-
chester), we have developed a secure, encrypted
internet connection that allows general practitioners,
diabetes nurse specialists, and, potentially, patients
immediate access to the diabetes information system
(see figure). We describe the problems, and solutions,
that we encountered in ensuring the confidentiality of
the data and in retaining the security of the hospital’s
private intranet (see table).
Salford diabetes information system
The diabetes information system was introduced in
1992 to facilitate diabetes care within Salford and is
used by all local general practitioners and hospital
diabetes services. This system is used by 35 districts in
Britain, facilitating diabetes care for about 200 000
people. For all patients it contains data, based on the
UK diabetes dataset,6 that are updated and verified
during their annual review. The diabetes system
prompts these annual reviews in both primary and
secondary care. For those patients receiving primary
care, the diabetes system generates a single page form
containing a summary of the data that is sent through
the post to their general practitioner. This system is
inflexible; if a patient were to attend his or her general
practitioner before the annual review was due this
information would be unavailable. Furthermore, after
the review the completed form is returned to the cen-
tral hospital, where the data are entered on to the
diabetes system, often several weeks later. An internet
connection with the central hospital would allow
appropriate healthcare professionals real time access







As an alternative to NHSnet, the internet can be
used to access patients’ medical records
Patient confidentiality is ensured by using strong
encryption and trusted third parties, these are
stronger methods than those used within NHSnet
The encryption and strong authentication have
been integrated into current browsers (such as
Internet Explorer), producing an interface that is
familiar to most people
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User authentication
As with all information systems, it is essential that the
people accessing the data are who they claim to be. Tra-
ditionally, computer systems have asked for passwords to
validate users. On a “stand alone” computer or secure
private networks (such as NHSnet) this is usually
adequate, but not for the internet. The ready availability
of “packet sniffers” (programs that sit in a computer net-
work and copy data that are later analysed to extract
usernames and passwords) and “cracker programs”
(which attempt to find a user’s password) make it
relatively easy for unauthorised people to obtain
passwords. Consequently, passwords that are not
encrypted cannot be used for reliable authentication
across the internet. We therefore used an encryption
technology known as public key encryption (Entrust
PKI, Entrust Technologies, Ottawa, Canada) to ensure
users were who they claimed to be (table).
Public key cryptography and digital
signatures
Asymmetric encryption relies on two keys that work
together as a pair—an encryption key and a decryption
key. If a user generates a pair of keys and makes the
decryption key public but keeps the encryption key
private, then only the user can encrypt a message but
anyone with the public key may decrypt it and thereby
be assured of the sender’s real identity (see appendix
on the BMJ website for further details).
Careful management of public keys is essential. If a
hacker successfully substitutes his public key for that of
a genuine user he could masquerade as that user and
gain access to the hospital diabetes system. The keys
are managed by a certification authority, a trusted third
party, that validates users and issues digitally signed
public keys (certificates) so that recipients can be
assured that the owner of the public key is genuine.
The Entrust system allows the management and use of
public key certificates to be centrally controlled by the
trusted third party. Such rigorous authentication
procedures ensure that hackers cannot masquerade as
a legitimate user.
The security infrastructure
The certification authority server and the public key
directory server used to publish all the certificates are
housed in a securely fortified room in the University of
Salford. Participants have a component of the Entrust
software (Direct Client) installed on their computer,
which generates the user’s pair of keys. It communicates
with the servers in order get the user’s public key
certified, and to download the certified public keys of
other users. The certification authority server will issue
certificates only to registered participants, so certifica-
tion is tightly controlled. In addition to the Entrust infra-
structure, a user’s private key is stored either on the
computer’s hard disk or on a personal smartcard (Activ-
Card Gold, Activcard SA, France). Storing the private
key on a smartcard provides increased security, allows
users to be authenticated on different machines, and
provides for sequential access by many users from the
same machine. In order to access the private key a per-
sonal identification number (PIN) must be entered, so an
impostor would need to both steal a user’s smartcard
and know his or her personal identification number in
order to masquerade as the user. This technology and
infrastructure enables strong authentication of users
accessing the diabetes system over the internet.
Finally, it is essential that healthcare professionals
are confident that they are accessing data from the
diabetes system and not from a false source. With the
same public key infrastructure, a certificate is issued to
the diabetes system. Consequently, a user receives a
digitally signed message from the diabetes system,
providing mutual authentication.
Entry into hospital network
Before a user can be authenticated by the hospital
diabetes system, the digitally signed message must be
given access to the hospital’s private intranet. It is essen-
tial to maintain the integrity of the hospital intranet and
avoid unauthorised entry via the internet while allowing
authorised traffic to gain access. This is a difficult balanc-
ing act: too strict a policy will deny authorised people
legitimate access to and from the internet, but too lax a





















Organisation of internet access to Salford diabetes information system showing location of
firewalls, smartcard, encryption software, and trusted third party applications
Summary of security problems and their solutions for accessing Salford diabetes
information system via the internet
Problem Description Solution
User authentication How does the hospital system know that a
remote user’s identity is genuine?
Strong user
authentication
Establishing access rights Which parts of the database does a known
user have access to?
Access controls on
the database
Unauthorised data capture How do we ensure that no one can take a copy
of data being transferred across the internet
from the hospital system to a remote user?
Strong encryption of
messages
Entry into the hospital network How do we protect hospital intranet from
unwanted traffic entering it while allowing
wanted traffic to pass through?
Firewall between the
intranet and internet
Easy to use interface How can we develop a simple yet secure
interface that most users will be familiar with
and will need minimum training to use and
that is low cost?
Web browsers
Correct data source How can remote users know they have
accessed the genuine hospital system and not
a site masquerading as the hospital?
Strong authentication
of the hospital system
Information in practice
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security was achieved by installing a firewall (Checkpoint
Software Technologies, Israel) between the hospital
intranet and the internet and requiring users to be
strongly authenticated to the Entrust Direct Server in
the firewall. This connection complies with the NHSnet
code of connection.4
Unauthorised data capture during
transmission across the internet
Sending patients’ information across the internet, which
can be openly accessed and is therefore subject to eaves-
dropping or interference, requires strong encryption to
make it extremely difficult to interpret or interfere with
the contents of a message. This was achieved using 128
bit, strong encryption (CAST 128 algorithm) of all the
data transmitted across the internet. Any attempt to
decrypt such a message by working through every possi-
ble key combination would, allowing one attempt every
microsecond, take an average of 5.4×1024 years (longer
than the earth has been in existence). The encryption is
automatically initiated after user authentication. This
ensures the encryption of all data before they traverse
the internet and enables users to access the data
unaware of, and not inconvenienced by, background
encryption.
Easy to use interface to the diabetes
information system
All the healthcare professionals who used the diabetes
information system were familiar with the paper
version of the diabetes form, and most were familiar
with using web browsers (Netscape Navigator (Net-
scape Communications, California, USA) or Microsoft
Internet Explorer (Microsoft, Redmond, USA)). We
therefore developed a web based interface to the
diabetes system that closely resembled the existing
form. The web interface uses hypertext mark-up
language (HTML) to present the form to users. The
form is generated dynamically from the diabetes server
by Microsoft’s Internet Information Server. The
diabetes server is queried by means of structured query
language (SQL), which is generated by computer
graphics interface running from the Internet Infor-
mation Server. Consequently, healthcare professionals
can access the diabetes information system in a format
similar to the one they are already using via a web
interface that they are already familiar with.
To simplify these processes, user verification, encryp-
tion, and starting the web browser automatically start
after the Entrust Direct Client is launched and the user’s
smartcard and personal identification number have
been inserted. This ensures that all data are encrypted
and digitally signed. The Entrust Direct Server then
decrypts the message and sends it to the web server,
which is oblivious to this intervening security layer. The
Entrust Direct Server was located in the hospital firewall
system, thereby ensuring that users were authenticated
before they accessed the hospital intranet (see table).
Establishing access rights
The existing diabetes system already had simple access
controls, with users divided into two groups (general
practitioner or consultant) and each group having
different privileges to allow them access to their own
patients’ data. A security table within the diabetes
system holds and enforces these privileges.
A simple search facility was incorporated within the
web interface to enable users, according to their user
privileges, to identify patients and to view and modify
their records. All modifications to patients’ record are
applied in real time, immediately updating the patient
records in the diabetes system—a considerable
improvement over the current paper based system,
where modifications may take weeks before being
available on the diabetes system. No data are actually
deleted from the diabetes system; mistakes can be
deleted from the viewed record but are retained within
the diabetes system, being marked “deleted.” An audit
trail identifies who has made any additions.
Summary
The use of information technology to improve health
care is the cornerstone of the government’s strategy for
the new NHS.7 We have described a simple to use, yet
effective, method for securely connecting a hospital
diabetes information system across the internet,
thereby providing patient specific information to gen-
eral practices or even patients’ homes. We believe that
such systems could be generically applied to most, if
not all, forms of chronic disease management. Easy
access to clinically relevant information may improve
patient care and, by reducing unnecessary duplication
of investigations, save money.
Although NHSnet will provide an NHS-wide private
network, clinicians should realise that it is not the only
solution for providing access to patients’ information.
We believe that our system is as safe as, if not safer than,
NHSnet. The sooner an NHS-wide standardisation for
encryption and trusted third party verification is defined
the better. Hopefully, these standards will be seamlessly
integrated into chronic disease management systems to
enable clinicians to fully harness the benefits of
improved availability of information without jeopardis-
ing patient confidentiality.
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